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TO USAREUR WEEKLY ADDRESS [REDACTED]

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SECTION ONE OF TWO  
FROM USAREUR CISC  
SUBJECT: USAREUR WEEKLY WATCH REPORT NR 36/68.  
23 SEPTEMBER 1968.

PART I - MILITARY SITUATION  
1. RECENT EVENTS HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED THE THREAT TO NATO AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE. THIS CHANGE HAS INVOLVED THE REPOSITIONING OF A NUMBER OF DIVISIONS, THE TEMPORARY NEUTRALIZATION OF THE ELEVEN CZECH ARMY DIVISION, A LOGISTICAL BUILD-UP IN THE FORWARD AREA, THE CALL-UP OF SOME RESERVES IN PROBABLY EVERY EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY AND THE USSR AND A GENERAL INCREASE IN THE ALERT/READINESS STATUS OF COMMUNIST (LESS CZECH) MILITARY UNITS.

2. ELEMENTS FROM AT LEAST THE CARPATHIAN MD, BELO- RUSSIAN MD AND BALTIC MD HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED IN THE FORWARD AREA AND REPORTS AS LATE AS 22 SEP INDICATE A CONTINUED WESTWARD MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT. REPORTS WHICH COULD REPRESENT TWO TO THREE DIVISIONS FROM THE USSR PLUS POLISH UNITS IN EAST GERMANY IN THE AREAS OF JUETERBOG, LETZINGER HEIDE, WITTSTOCK/TEMPLIN AND EAST OF BERLIN HAVE BEEN RECEIVED. IN ADDITION, ELEMENTS OF THE BULGARIAN 17TH MRD, KHASKOVO, HAVE REPORTEDLY RECENTLY MOVED TO THE YUGOSLAV BORDER, AND THE SOUTHERN GROUP OF FORCES 35TH GMRD, KECSKEMET, HAS RETURNED TO HUNGARY FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA, PLACING THIS DIVISION WITHIN 100 KM OF BOTH ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA. OTHER RECENT MOVES INCLUDE THE ACTIVATION OF A NEW RADAR SITE (PROBABLY EARLY WARNING) NEAR GERA, EAST GERMANY; INTRODUCTION OF A NEW RADAR (POSSIBLY AN ACQUISITION RADAR FOR A NEW SAM SYSTEM) AT PRITZWALK, EAST GERMANY; ACTIVATION OF AUXILIARY AIRFIELDS NEAR HASSLEBEN, EAST GERMANY (P84165) AND MEZOKOVESD, HUNGARY (DT6896); DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE GSFG 12TH GRD OUT OF GARRISON WITH NO INDICATIONS AS YET OF EXERCISE ACTIVITY; THE POSSIBLE INTERGRATION OF EAST GERMAN VCPO UNITS INTO THE EAST GERMAN ARMY (EGA); AND RECENT VCPO/EGA MOVEMENT ACTIVITY (POSSIBLE EXERCISE ASSOCIATED) SOUTH OF BERLIN.

3. TO DATE, THERE HAVE BEEN NO CONFIRMED REPORTS OF

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MAJOR SOVIET UNITS RETURNING TO THE USSR. THE ONLY DIVISION KNOWN TO HAVE LEFT THE CSSR IS THE 35TH CMRD WHICH RETURNED TO HUNGARY. BY COMPARISON, THERE HAVE BEEN CONTINUED REPORTS THAT WESTWARD MOVEMENT CONTINUES FROM AT LEAST THE BALTIC, BELORUSSIAN, AND CARPATHIAN MDS. SOME OF THIS MOVEMENT OBVIOUSLY HAS BEEN RESUPPLY OF THOSE UNITS DEPLOYED TO THE FORWARD AREA, BUT THERE ARE OTHER INDICATIONS - SUCH AS THE SIGHTINGS OF TANKS, ARTILLERY PIECES, AND COMBAT ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT - WHICH POINT TO A CONTINUED BUILD-UP IN THE FORWARD AREA, ESPECIALLY IN EAST GERMANY. CONSEQUENTLY, THE LONGER SOVIET FORCES NOT ORIGINALLY ASSIGNED TO THE FORWARD AREA CONTINUE TO BE LOCATED THERE, THE LONGER THE THREAT TO NATO EXISTS AND THE STRONGER IT BECOMES. SOME OF THE FACTORS WHICH INDICATE OR FAVOR WARSAW PACT OFFENSIVE ACTION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. NO MAJOR UNITS HAVE RETURNED TO THE USSR.
- B. WARSAW PACT FORCES CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN MORE THAN AMPLE TO NEUTRALIZE CZECHOSLOVAKIA REMAIN THEREIN.
- C. DESPITE SOME REPORTS OF LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS, SSUPPLIES HAVE CONTINUED TO FLOW AND SERVE THOSE DEPLOYED UNITS IN QUANTITIES APPARENTLY CONSISTENT FOR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS.
- D. THE CALL-UP OF RESERVISTS APPARENTLY CONTINUES WITH ONLY LIMITED INDICATIONS OF RELEASING THOSE ALREADY CALLED UP.
- E. THE IMBALANCE OF FORCES OPPOSING CENTAGE CONTINUES, AND NEW DIVISIONS ARE BEING RELOCATED IN CENTRAL EAST GERMANY, INDICATING AT LEAST A RESTORATION OF THE PRE-MAY CAPABILITY AGAINST NORTHAG AND BERLIN WITHOUT DIMINISHING THE CENTAGE THREAT.
- F. THE CONTINUATION OF GOOD OPERATIONS NEARER FOR AT LEAST ONE MORE MONTH.
- G. THE LACK OF NATO REACTION TO THE CZECH INVASION.
- H. THE NATO REDUCTION OF FORCES TREND.
- I. THE PREOCCUPATION BY THE UNITED STATES WITH VIET NAM WITH NO SIGN OF PROGRESS FROM THE PARIS TALKS.
- J. THE DISUNITY OF THE US AND THE FREE WORLD OPINIONS OVER MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN VIET NAM.
- K. THE EASE OF THE CZECH OCCUPATION DUE PARTLY TO DUCCEK'S URGING COMPLIANCE WITH THE SOVIETS.

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SECTION FINAL OF TWO

L. THE PREPONDERANCE OF ARMOR IN WARSAW PACT DEPLOYMENTS ADJACENT TO FRG-CZECH BORDER IS CONSISTENT WITH SOVIET OFFENSIVE DOCTRINE.

M. RECENT MILITARY MOVEMENTS ARE TOWARD BERLIN, WEST GERMANY, RUMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA, RATHER THAN IN THE OTHER DIRECTION.

4. DESPITE THE INCREASE OF FORCES IN BOTH EAST GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THERE IS NO CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT WARSAW PACT FORCES ARE PREPARING FOR AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST NATO FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF INDICATORS CAN NOT BE DENIED. SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS INTO THE FORWARD AREA NOW REPRESENT THE HEAVIEST INVESTMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCE OUTSIDE THE USSR SINCE WORLD WAR II. IN SPITE OF WHAT MUST BE AN OBVIOUS FACT THAT NATO INTENDS NO REACTION TO THE CZECH INVASION, THIS DEPLOYMENT CONTINUES. EXTENSIVE RESERVIST CALL-UPS, MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIAN TRANSPORT AND RESUPPLY OF SOME 30 SOVIET DIVISIONS WHICH ARE FAR FROM HOME STATIONS MUST ADD UP TO A SEVERE DRAIN ON THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND BUDGET. THIS HUGE AND COSTLY INVESTMENT IS IN PLACE TO BE FURTHER EXPLOITED WHILE THE OPPORTUNITY EXISTS. THEREFORE, THE LONGER THE PRESENT BUILD-UP REMAINS IN PLACE, THE MORE THE PROBABILITY INCREASES THAT FURTHER OFFENSIVE ACTION WILL TAKE PLACE. THIS ACTION COULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST LIMITED OBJECTIVES SUCH AS ONE OR ALL OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES (RUMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA), AUSTRIA OR WEST BERLIN. THE CAPABILITY HAS ALSO INCREASED TO CONDUCT AN OFFENSIVE (OR OFFENSIVES) INTO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

PART II - POLITICAL SITUATION

5. THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE PRESENTLY SURROUNDING THE BERLIN AND WEST GERMAN QUESTIONS CONTINUES TO BE TENSE, LARGELY BECAUSE OF MOSCOW'S PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER

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THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS CAMPAIGN IS TO DEFLECT ATTENTION AWAY FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND OTHER PARTS OF EASTERN EUROPE OR TO PREPARE A JUSTIFICATION FOR AGGRESSIVE ACTION AGAINST BERLIN AND/OR WEST GERMANY. IT IS ALSO UNCLEAR HOW FAR SUCH AGGRESSIVE ACTION MIGHT GO, IF UNDERTAKEN. THE WEST GERMAN PARLIAMENTARY MEETINGS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN WEST BERLIN FROM 25 OCTOBER TO 1 NOVEMBER AND THE CDU PARTY CONGRESS TO TAKE PLACE THERE DURING THE PERIOD 4-6 NOVEMBER CAN BE EXPECTED TO TRIGGER A SOVIET/EAST GERMAN REACTION. IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT SOVIET PROPAGANDA LINE, THIS REACTION WILL PROBABLY BE MORE VIGOROUS THAN THOSE REPORTED EARLIER THIS YEAR AND LAST YEAR. FURTHER, THE IRRATIONAL SOVIET ACTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA PROVIDES A PRECEDENT FOR EVEN MORE SERIOUS ACTION AGAINST BERLIN OR WEST GERMANY. HOWEVER, FROM THE POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC POINTS OF VIEW, ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA MUST HAVE GREATER IMPORTANCE FOR SOVIET PLANNERS THAN BERLIN AND WEST GERMANY. THE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS OF THESE ONCE-LOYAL MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET BLOC ARE OF THE SAME SORT WHICH APPEARED TO PROVOKE SOVIET MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE USSR. BOTH OF THESE BALKAN COUNTRIES ARE SEEKING INCREASINGLY TO DRAW ON WESTERN INDUSTRIAL ASSISTANCE AND TRADE, THEREBY REDUCING THEIR ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON MOSCOW; AND YUGOSLAV COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY IS IN SOME RESPECTS EVEN MORE HERETICAL THAN THAT OF THE CZECHS. FINALLY, YUGOSLAVIA AND ROMANIA COULD BE OCCUPIED MILITARILY WITH FAR LESS RISK OF A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST THAN SUCH AN ACTION AGAINST BERLIN OR WEST GERMANY WOULD ENTAIL. FOR THESE REASONS, AN INTERVENTION IN THE TWO BALKAN COUNTRIES (AND PROBABLY ALBANIA AS WELL) IS THE MORE PLAUSIBLE SUBJECT OF CURRENT SOVIET PLANNING. IF THIS IS THE CASE, SEVERE HARASSMENT OF BERLIN COULD SERVE AS A SCREENING ACTION UNTIL THE OCCUPATION OF THE BALKANS IS COMPLETED.

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